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SEEKING ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN THE
FACE OF ENDURING RACISM
DeserieeKennedy*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1967, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. gave a speech to Stanford University students about economic injustice titled The Other
America. In that speech, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. stated that
"there are literally two Americas. One America is beautiful . . . in
this America millions of young people grow up in the sunlight of
opportunity. But tragically and unfortunately, there is another
America. This other America that has a daily ugliness that constantly transforms the buoyancy of hope into the fatigue of despair."1 In this speech, Dr. King strove to highlight the gap between
the rich and poor, the powerful and powerless, and the racial dynamic of these disparities. His speech highlights the struggle for
economic and political equality for Blacks2 and the economic
strata separating Whites and Blacks held in place by structural and
regulatory policies.3 And the "Other America" persisted, as Dr.
King stated because too many people "are concerned about

* Deseriee Kennedy, Associate Dean of Diversity & Inclusion, Professor of Law,
Touro College Law Center. Thanks to Lauren Wray for her very helpful research assistance. The author also thanks the Loyola University of Chicago
Consumer Law Review for this outstanding Symposium.
50 Years Ago: Martin Luther King, Jr., Speaks atStanford University, THE
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. REs. & EDUC. INST. (Apr. 14, 2017), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/news/5 0-years-ago-martin-luther-king-jr-speaks-stanforduniversity. [hereinafter "50 Years Ago"] Dr. King gave the talk "The Other
America" at Stanford University on April 14, 1967; see also Transcript: The
Other America, Dr. Martin Luther King https://www.crmvet.org/docs/otheram.htm (last visited April 15, 2021).
2 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Slavery, Liberty, and the Right to Contract, 19 NEV.
L.J. 447, 448 (2018); id. at 465.
' See 50 Years Ago, supra note 1, at 465.
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tranquility and the status quo than about justice and humanity."4
The persistence of wealth disparities and the continued overrepresentation of Blacks among the poor has spurred significant research, commentary, and calls for action.' There is an ongoing debate about what proposals are likely to affect the growing racial
gap in wealth significantly. 6 Civil Rights legislation and affirmative action are two ways lawmakers have focused on addressing
the gap. Laws that prohibit discrimination in employment, housing, lending, and contracting, among other activities, should be effective arrows in the quiver to aim at racist practices and to dismantle this Other America. However, without the ability to
enforce these rights through courts, the grant of substantive rights
lacks effect. Dismantling barriers to Black economic development
requires an intersection of acknowledging substantive rights and
providing procedural access.
This essay examines the extent to which the perpetuation of
the wealth gap is actively assisted by the imposition of legal standards that make it difficult to seek legal redress for harms caused by
the structural racial barriers in place. Race neutral pleading standards that make it difficult for plaintiffs to bring viable racial discrimination claims narrow access to the courts. This has the effect
of making it difficult for individuals to right wrongs and sends a
message about the extent to which society is invested in undoing
structural barriers to closing the racial wealth gap. Part II of the

' Martin Luther King, Jr, "The Other America" Address at Gross Pointe
High School (Mar. 14, 1968), in https://www.gphistorical.org/mlk/mlkspeech/mlk-gp-speech.pdf.
s Cedric Herring and Loren Henderson, Wealth Inequality in Black and
White: Culturaland StructuralSources of the Racial Wealth Gap, 8 RACE SOC.
PROBL. 4, 14 - 15 (2016); Federal Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances
(last conducted in 2019); see Neil Bhutta, et. al., Disparitiesin Wealth by Race
and Ethnicity in the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (September 28, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-race-and-ethnicityin-the-2 019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm.
6 William Darity, Jr., et al., What We Get Wrong About Closing the Racial
Wealth Gap, SAMUEL DuBoIs COOK CTR. ON SOc. EQUITY AT DUKE UNIV..,
INSIGHT

CTR.

FOR

CMTY.

ECON.

DEV.

(2018)

https://so-

.

cialequity.duke.edu/portfolio-item/what-we-get-wrong-about-closing-the-racial-wealth-gap
' See e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, DiscriminationLaw: The New Franken-Tor,
65 DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 723 (2016); Sandra F. Sperino, Let's PretendDiscriminationIs A Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1109 (2014).
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essay discusses the enactment of the first Civil Rights Act and its
focus on addressing the legacy of slavery and the treatment of
Black people during Reconstruction. In Part III, the essay turns to
a discussion of the barriers imposed on the realization of the Act's
purpose by superimposing a tort-based standard onto discrimination law. Part IV argues that the Court's tort-based approach to
contract discrimination claims neutralizes the Civil Rights Act's
power to level the economic playing field and help reduce the racial
wealth gap. It asserts that current interpretations of the first Civil
Rights Act are inconsistent with contemporary understandings of
how unconscious bias affects the "making and enforcement of contracts." It asserts that the Supreme Court's current approach to
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 places us in a loop that returns us, in
many respects, to the Reconstruction era. Finally, Part V concludes that a return to the original intent of the drafters of the 1866
Civil Rights Act would ensure that claims that allege race as a motivating factor in contracting to be sufficient.

II.

THE 1866

CIVIL RIGHTS

ACT

Close to 100 years before King's 1967 speech at the height
of the Civil Rights Movement, Congress debated the newly freed
African Americans' economic rights before passing the first Civil
Rights Act. After amending the Constitution to end slavery, the
right to be seen as citizens and to contract freely were the first civil
rights recognized by the U.S. Congress. The Civil Rights Act of
1866, now codified in Title 42 of the United States Code section
1981, was enacted even before the Fourteenth Amendment's grant
of citizenship to the newly freed slaves was ratified. Section 1 of
the Act provides, "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts
... as is enjoyed by [W]hite citizens."8 The Civil Rights Act was a
response by the Reconstruction Congress to Blacks' formal and informal exclusions from public life.9 The bill's sponsor, Senator
8 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2018). In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
the Supreme Court held that the statute protects all races. McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976). Section 2 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, later codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982, provides that "All citizens
of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as
is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal.
9 See e.g., Zietlow, supranote 2, at 469 (stating "members of the Reconstruction did not view freedom of contract as an end in itself; they saw freedom of
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Trumbull, stated, "[i]t is idle to say that a man is free who cannot
go and come at pleasure, who cannot buy and sell, who cannot enforce his rights." 10 Senator Trumbull further noted, "[t]his measure
is intended to give effect to that declaration [abolishing slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment] and secure to all persons within
the United States practical freedom."" - and Trumbull noted-"the Act was designed to secure to all persons within the United
States practical freedom."12
The Act was a recognition that Whites actively barred
Blacks from engaging in commercial activity with the same freedom.1 3 After the Civil War, "'southern whites' systemic refusal to
sell property or extend credit to the former slaves, meant that the
majority of blacks would remain economically dependent upon the
group of people. . . whom they had served as slaves."" Legislation
known as the Black Codes, which applied only to African Americans, restricted Blacks' rights to own property, work, contract, and
move freely through society." The Black Codes kept the freed enslaved by limiting the freedom of contract, among other things.
For example, Black Codes tied Blacks to abusive sharecropping
arrangements, policed the newly freed African Americans through
vague vagrancy laws that made it a crime to be unemployed and
16
prevented leaving employment without "working off" advances.
Melissa Milewski describing the Black Codes, states:
In many southern states, the codes required that African
Americans have written evidence of employment at all
times and allowed any white person to arrest them if they

contract as a means towards their goal of establishing equal citizenship and fundamental rights for freed slaves and empowering all").
10 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2198 (1968).
at 2198-99; Barry Sullivan, HistoricalReconstruction, Reconstruction
11 Id
History, and the ProperScope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 564 (1989).
12
13
14

Id. at 2198-99.

Zietlow, supra note 2, at 473; Sullivan, supranote 11, at 552-53.
JACQUELINE

JONES,

LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW, BACK

WOMEN, WORK AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT, 52 (1985).
1s W.E.B. DU BoIs, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 329 (1935);
MELISSA MILEWSKI, LITIGATING ACROSS THE COLOR LINE, CIVIL CASES
BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE SOUTHERNERS FROM THE END OF SLAVERY TO

CIVIL RIGHTS 33 (2018); Jones, supra note 14, at 52; Zietlow, supra note 2, at
462 (noting the Black Codes were a form of indentured servitude).
16 Brian Sawyers, Race, and Property After the Civil War: Creating the
Right to Exclude, 87 MIss. L.J. 703, 707, 730-31 (2018).
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left before the end of their employment contracts. As
punishment for not having employment, black southerners were to be hired out on chain gangs, put in stocks, and
left in solitary confinement with only bread and water.
. the 1865 Mississippi legislature declared that thieves
could be hanged from their thumbs and black people unable to pay fines would have their labor hired out to the
highest bidder."

The Black Codes were also "formulated to restrict their participation in occupations that could lead to independent enterprises" and
restricted access to business licenses, own distilleries, sell liquor,
rent or lease urban property. 8 The Black Codes kept the freed
Africans enslaved, in essence, by limiting their freedom of contract,
among other things.
Significantly, the restrictions created by the laws lasted far
beyond their formal existence. Even though the Black Codes, as
legal restrictions, lasted a relatively short period, the barriers they
created continued to be enforced. The Black Codes and racial violence bound the freed Blacks to Whites. 9 Whites continued to
impose restrictions on Blacks' ability to engage in commerce freely
through exclusion and private violence designed to maintain a system of white supremacy. Whites also imposed restrictions on
Blacks through private violence intended to maintain a racial hierarchy and white supremacy. The Civil War and the 13h Amendment ended slavery in many forms but did little to address white
supremacy. One of the lasting legacies of American slavery is the
racial hierarchy which placed those considered a member of the
"white race" at the top of the hierarchy and those considered Black
at the bottom. The Black Codes, like all laws, were simply.a codified expression of White desire. The eradication of these laws did
not end the desire to impose a system of white supremacy. Today,
the desire remains with us in the voices of the "Karens" who privately police Black bodies and their movements.2 0
" Milewski, supra note 15, at 33.
' JULIET E. K. WALKER, THE HISTORY OF BLACK
BUSINESS IN AMERICA,
CAPITALISM, RACE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 151-52; Zietlow, supra note 2, at 473,

478.
19 DuBois, supranote 15, at 671.

See e.g., Karen Grisby Gates, What's In A Karen, Code Switch, NPR
(July, 15, 2020, 1:03 PM) https://www.npr.org/2020/07/14/891177904/whats-ina-karen (stating Karens are, "women, almost always white, who are entitled,
often racist and determined to get what they want. And what they want, to a
20
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The current version of the Civil Rights Act in § 1981 requires plaintiffs to allege that defendants acted intentionally and
purposefully to discriminate against them on the basis of race and
that the discrimination was directed toward activities protected by
the statute.2 1 The Act requires treatment of someone in the "making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and
the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of
the contractual relationship."2 2 be the same "as is enjoyed by white
citizens." Unfortunately, many in America actively seek to monopolize the enjoyment of these "benefits and privileges," leading to
litigation by plaintiffs of color against large institutions or corporations.
III.

REQUIRING "BUT FOR" CAUSATION IN
DISCRIMINATION SUITS

In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has imposed a
tort-based causation doctrine onto discrimination claims, and in
2020, the Court imposed a "but for" causation standard onto pleading requirements in §1981 claims. In Comcast Corp. v. Nat'lAss'n
ofAfrican Am. -Owned Media (NAAOM), Entertainment Studios
Network (ESN) sued Comcast for violating §1981. The plaintiff,
ESN, is a Black-owned television network operator, founded in
1993 by Byron Allen, a comic turned entrepreneur. ESN produces
more than 60 syndicated T.V. shows and owns eight channels, including The Weather Channel, Local Now, and Comedy.T.V.
ESN alleged that Comcast repeatedly refused to contract with
them, made several different requests of ESN during the negotiations, and launched multiple White-owned networks during that
time, but declined to carry ESN.23 According to the ESN
frequent degree, is the ability to determine where Black and brown bodies may
or may not be present"); Cady Lang, How the 'Karen Meme' Confronts the Violent History of White Womanhood, TIME (July 6, 2020, 4:11 PM)
https://time.com/5857023/karen-meme-history-meaning/ (remarking on the historical roots of "white women's victimhood" in modern times).
21 But see, Ian Ayres, FairDriving: Genderand Race Discriminationin Retail CarNegotiations, 104 HARv. L. REv. 817, 863 (1991) (arguing in favor of
modernizing § 1981 claims to allow disparate impact suits which do not require
establishing intent to discriminate).
22 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2018).
23 Brief for Respondents at 1, Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n African Am.Owned Media and Entm't Studios, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (No. 18-1171),
2019 WL 3824689 at *5.
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complaint, during the negotiations period, a Comcast executive
stated that Comcast was not "trying to create any more Bob Johnsons," a remark that ESN took as a reference to Robert Johnson,
the African American founder of Black Entertainment Network
("BET"). ESN pointed to Comcast's conduct and alleged that
Comcast refused to enter into a contract with them to carry their
channels because of race and that ESN was not given the same
right to contract as White-owned media companies in violation of
the Civil Rights law. In response, Comcast filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 198, asserting
that it had legitimate business reasons for refusing to contract with

ESN.
Dismissal at the pleading stage turned on whether plaintiffs
are obligated to allege discriminatory intent was the "but-for cause"
of the refusal or a motivating factor in the refusal to contract. The
district court took the position that the plaintiffs complaints did
not establish discriminatory intent as the "but-for cause" of Comcast's refusal to enter into a contract with ESN. The district court
dismissed the plaintiffs complaint noting that the plaintiff failed
to "undercut" the defendant's "alternative explanation" for refusing
to contract with the plaintiff. It opined that the complaint "did not
exclude" the refusal to contract "was based on legitimate business
reasons." As noted in the Supreme Court opinion, the complaint
was dismissed after two amendments permitted by the court, "[b]ut
each time, the court concluded, ESN's efforts fell short of plausibly
showing that, but for racial animus, Comcast would have contracted with ESN."2 The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal,
reasoning that at the pleading stage of litigation, "[p]laintiffs need
only to plausibly allege that discriminatory intent was a factor in
Comcast's refusal to contract." The Circuit court reasoned, "a
plaintiff must only plead facts plausibly showing that race played
'some role' in the defendant's decision-making process."25 The appellate court noted that, based on the complaint, it could plausibly
infer that ESN "experienced disparate treatment due to race and
thus was denied the same right to contract as a White-owned company." The court found that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to
suggest race played a role in the case.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. The Court concluded that
plaintiffs must plausibly allege that race was a "but for" cause of
"4 Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1013 (2020).
Id. at 1013.

2
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the alleged discrimination. The Court found that alleging race as a
motivating factor is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. In
so doing, the Court arguably raises a question of what imposing a
"but for" standard will mean for plaintiffs alleging discrimination
at the earliest stage of the litigation and whether the more rigorous
approach will deter or bar plaintiffs from seeking relief.2 6
The Supreme Court glosses over the fact that the statute
"does not expressly discuss causation" while asserting that the statute guarantee that each person is entitled to the "same right ... as
is enjoyed by White citizens" "fits naturally with the ordinary rule
Although the
that a plaintiff must prove but-for causation."2
Court acknowledges that section 1981 does not use causal language, it imposes a "but for" causation requirement, providing that
doing so is required unless a statute indicates otherwise. The Court
reasoned that a private right of action under the statute was not
found until Runyon v. McCrarywas decided in 1976, which also
limited section 1981 cases to claims related to the formation of a
contract.28 The Court then noted that its overly restrictive reading
of the Act in Pattersonv. McClean Credit Union was overruled by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made clear that the statute applies to all aspects of contracting. The Court stated that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 made clear that section 1981 "includes the making, performance, modification and termination of contracts, and
the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of
the contractual relationship." 29
The Court rejected the plaintiff's analogy to the Title VII
"motivating factor" test, concluding that Congress in amending Title VII did not also amend § 1981 to allow for a "motivating factor
test." The motivating factor test stems from the employment discrimination statute, Title VII's acknowledgment of mixed-motive

See Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 364 (2013)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting requiring plaintiffs satisfy a "but-for" causation
rather than a "mixed motive" standard for Title VII retaliation claims imposes
a "stricter standard").
27 Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1015 (2020).
" Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (finding § 1981 created a private
right of action against Virginia private schools for refusing to admit Black stu26

dents).
29 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (holding section 1981 "does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract"); 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
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claims. 30 The Court found no basis for applying the burden-shifting mixed motives Title VII standard to § 1981 claims. Instead, the
Court relied on common law tort principles as an appropriate analogy for pleading requirements under 42 U.S.C. §1981, stating that
"the common law in 1866 often treated a showing of but-for causation as a prerequisite to a tort suit." The opinion points to Supreme
Court precedent, which referred to the statute as "afford[ing] a federal remedy against discrimination . .. on the basis of race," which
the court argues is "strongly suggestive of a but-for causation
standard."" Without dissent, the Court found that "to prevail, a
plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for
race, it would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected
right.""
It is important to note that the road to the conclusion that
discrimination in contracting claims requires pleading and proving
"but for" causation was not always so clear.33 Before the Supreme
Court's NAAOM decision, the circuits disagreed about whether
plaintiffs must prove that race was the "but for" reason for the

30 Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment "on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin" and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). The
Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 490 U.S. 228, 258
(1989), found that Title VII allows for mixed-motive claims-making an employer's conduct actionable where the plaintiff being a member of a protected
class is a motivating factor in the employment decision.
31 Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1016 (2020) (quoting Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-460 (1975) (emphasis added in Comcast)). Note that the Court had previously required "but for" causation to be
alleged in disability claims under the Americans with Disability Act and age
discrimination under ADEA. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Medical Ctr. v. Nassar, 570
U.S. 338 (2013) (finding plaintiffs must show "but for" causation to establish a
Title VII retaliation claim); Gross v. F.B.L. Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S.
167 (2009) (finding plaintiffs are required to establish "but for" cause under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

" Comcast Corp. 140 S. Ct. at 1019; Deseriee A. Kennedy, ConsumerDiscrimination:The Limitationsof FederalCivil RightsProtection,66 Mo. L. REv.
275 (2001).
3 See e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund,
Inc. and Ten Civil Rights Litigating Organizations in Support of Respondents,
Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, (No. 18-1171) 2019
WL 4858286 (U.S. 2019); Brief of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law and Twenty-One National Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, (No.
18-1171) 2019 WL 4897098 (U.S. 2019).
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decision or one motivating factor.3 4 Additionally, depending on the
lower court's interpretation of the "but for" standard, the National
Association of African American-OwnedMedia case may significantly raise the bar for plaintiffs seeking to overcome the pleading
stage of litigation. The Supreme Court decision does not explain
whether the "but for" standard requires the plaintiff to allege and
prove that race is the sole cause of differing treatment or just one
key factor. Although the meaning of "but for" causation is not entirely clear,3 ' The decision was immediately feted by legal counsel
for employers and large corporations who claimed the decision as
a win and were encouraged to file motions to dismiss. 36 The case
is the most recent example of the Court's intertwining of procedural and substantive law to impose a view of what is required to
prevail in a discrimination claim which is out of step with the purpose of the Civil Rights Act statute. The approach is also inconsistent with current understandings of how subtle forms of racism
manifest in systems and structures that maintain the racial hierarchy that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was designed to help dismantle.
The Comcast decision does not clearly define the "but for"
standard in contracting discrimination cases. On the one hand,
judges may apply a "but for" causation standard if race is one of
many factors affecting a decision whether to contract and allowing
plaintiffs to move past the pleading stage.3" Bostock found that

Brief of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, supranote 33.
See Nat'l Ass'n of African-Am. Owned Media v. Charter Commc'ns,
Inc., No. CV 16-609-GW(FFMX), 2016 WL 9023601 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2016),
aff'd, 908 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2018), opinion withdrawn and superseded on
reh'g, 915 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 140 S. Ct.
2561, 206 L. Ed. 2d 493 (2020), and vacatedand remanded, 804 F. App'x 710
(9th Cir. 2020), and aff'd, 915 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2019), andcert. granted,judgment vacated, 140 S. Ct. 2561, 206 L. Ed. 2d 493 (2020).
36 See e.g., Blake M. Edwards, "ButFor"vs. 'Motivating"-Now Two Similar Anti-Discrimination Laws Have Different Proofs of Causation, LEWIS
BRISBOIS (Mar. 25, 2020), https://lewisbrisbois.com/newsroom/legal-alerts/butUS.
for-vs.-motivating-now-two-similar-anti-discrimination-laws-have-differ;
3'
33

Supreme Court Confirms A But-For CausationStandardForSection 1981 Discrimination Claims, LIEBERT CASSIDY WHITMORE (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.lcwlegal.com/news/us-supreme-court-confirms-a-but-for-causation-standard-for-section-1981-discrimination-claims-3.
" Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1013; Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned
Media, et al. v. Charter Commcn's, Inc., et al., No. 2:16-cv-00609-GW-(FFMx),
Tentative Ruling on Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended
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Title VII's prohibition against discrimination "because of" an individual's sex includes discrimination based on sexual orientation
and transgender status.38 In reaching that conclusion, the court
notes that "those who adopted the Civil Rights Act [of 1964] might
not have anticipated their work would lead to this particularly result ... But the limits of the drafters' imagination supply no reason
to ignore the law's demands." 39 The Bostock court notes that the
"because of" language in the statute "incorporates the 'simple' and
'traditional' standard of but-for causation." However, in Bostock
v. Clayton, the Court finds that "[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the
adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that
contributed to its challenged employment decision."4 0
In support of its explanation of "but for" causation, the
court cites to University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar and Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc." Nassar involved a Title VII race and religion harassment retaliation claim.
Noting the 1991 amendment of Title VII, which allowed the plaintiff to obtain declaratory relief, attorney's fees and costs, and injunctive relief if race was a "motivating factor"4 2 but concludes that
"a plaintiff making a retaliation claim under § 2000e-3(a) must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the
alleged adverse action by the employer."" Unlike NAAOM, four
justices dissented in Nassar. Ginsberg, writing for the dissent reasons that, "the word 'because' does not inevitably demand but-for
causation to the exclusion of all other causation formulations.
When more than one factor contributes to a plaintiffs injury, butfor causation is problematic."" The dissent further explains that
modern tort law is more generous than the standard the majority
articulates in Nassarfor Title VII retaliation claims. It notes that
tort law "permits the plaintiff to prevail upon showing that either
[of two] sufficient condition[s] created the harm."" Ginsberg goes
Complaint, August 27, 2020. Defendant Charter Communications Inc.'s Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.
38 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1734,
(2020).
3 Id
at 1737.
40 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020).
41 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013); Gross v.
FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
4

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med Ctr., 570 U.S. at 349.

4 Id at 362.
44 Id at 383 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
45

Id
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on to quote the concurrence in Price Waterhouse, in which Justice
O'Connor stated,
[I]n the area of tort liability, from whence the dissent's
'but-for' standard of causation is derived, ... the law has
long recognized that in certain civil cases' leaving the
burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to prove 'but-for'
causation would be both unfair and destructive of the deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care.
Thus, in multiple causation cases, where a breach of duty
has been established, the common law of torts has long
shifted the burden of proof to ... defendants to prove that
their negligent actions were not the 'but-for cause of the
plaintiff's injury.4 6
Ginsberg, remarks that "a strict but-for test is particularly ill suited
to employment discrimination cases." The strong dissent in Nassar, increases the surprise that the Court applied the "but for" causation standard to § 1981 claims, notably since the Civil Rights
statute lacks the Court's repeatedly referenced "because of" language of Title VII and instead refers to Blacks having the "same
rights as" Whites to contract.
In Gross v. FBL FinancialServices, Inc. served as support
for the majority's conclusion in NAAOMand Nassarthat the discrimination statutes in issue in each of those cases require plaintiffs
to plead and prove "but for" causation. The Court in FBL Financial Services, Inc. found that Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) case that the use of the words "because of" in the statute means that "establish that age was the "but-for" cause of the
employer's adverse action" and citing a torts treatise in support of
its analysis. 48 In his dissent in the age discrimination case, Gross v
F.B.L. FinancialServices, Inc., Justice Breyer states, "the words
"because of" do not inherently require a showing of "but-for" causation, and I see no reason to read them to require such a

46

Id.at384.

4 Id at 384-85.

Gross, 557 U.S. at 177 (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)
4

(finding ADEA plaintiffs must prove that age was the "but for" cause of defendant's conduct and that the burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer
to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age)).
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showing." 49 His dissent succinctly notes the discordance in applying tort causation in discrimination claims stating,
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show
"but-for" causation. In that context, reasonably objective
scientific or commonsense theories of physical causation
make the concept of "but-for" causation comparatively
easy to understand and relatively easy to apply. But it is
an entirely different matter to determine a "but-for" relation when we consider, not physical forces, but the mindrelated characterizations that constitute motive. Sometimes we speak of determining or discovering motives,
but more often we ascribe motives, after an event, to an
individual in light of the individual's thoughts and other
circumstances present at the time of decision. In a case
where we characterize an employer's actions as having
been taken out of multiple motives. . . to apply "but-for"
causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about
what would have happened if the employer's thoughts
and other circumstances had been different. The answer
to this hypothetical inquiry will often be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows less than does
the employer about what the employer was thinking at
the time, the employer will often be in a stronger position
than the employee to provide the answer.5 0
Interestingly, in a separate but factually similar case by
NAAOM against Charter Communications, Inc., the district court
rejects the view that NAAOMrequires a "sole factor" test in refusing to dismiss NAAOM's complaint. Taking a similar approach to
Breyer's dissent in F.B.L. FinancialServices, the district court
noted that a sole factor test would be "all-but-impossible for a
plaintiff to be able to meet in most situations ... pre-discovery and
contradicts the ease with which plaintiffs have historically been
able to plead such a claim at the outset of a case."" The Charter
Id at 190 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
so Id at 190-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding mixed-motives jury instruction is never proper in an A.D.E.A. case).
" Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1013; Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned
Media v. Charter Commcn's, Inc., D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00609-GW-(FFMx). Tentative Ruling on Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, August 27, 2020. Defendant Charter Communications Inc.'s Renewed
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.
49
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district court reasoned that the Supreme Court's definition of "but
for" in a Title VII sex discrimination in an employment case that
"but for" does not mean sole causation is equally applicable in section 1981.52 Emphasizing that a discrimination complaint that
"identifies the type of discrimination that she thinks occurs . . by
whom . . . and when" is sufficient to put the defendant on notice
how" in [Plaintiffs'] mind[s] at least the 'dots' are 'connected.'"
Aside from issues of clarity regarding the meaning of "but
for" in contracting discrimination cases, the tort-based standard
being imposed by the Court in discrimination cases has been criticized as inconsistent with common understandings of causation
doctrine at the time the statute was enacted.

IV.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, THE RACIAL WEALTH
GAP, & IMPLICIT BIAS

The NAAOM "but for" interpretation cripples the civil
rights statute as a tool in the struggle against racist economic behavior. The Civil Rights statutes were intended to create freed Africans' right to assert economic power to transition from being deprived of the fruits of their labor and talents to begin to build
wealth.5 3 Ongoing explicit and implicit racist acts have hampered
the ability to contract freely and build wealth.54 As a result, the
imbalance of power, wealth, and resources based on racial catego55
ries continues today and the racial wealth gap is growing. Wealth
"is of paramount importance as a pool of resources, beyond income,
that individuals or families can use as a sustained mechanism for
provision of support for their offspring. Wealth represents longterm resource accumulation and provides the economic security to
take risks, shield against financial loss, and cope with

s2 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1744.
s3 Sullivan, supra note 11, at 550.
" MELVIN L. OLIVER

& THOMAS

M. SHAPIRO, AM. BECOMING, RACIAL

TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES: VOLUME

II, 224-25 (Nat'l Research

Council, Nat'l Academies Press, 2001), https://doi.org/10.17226/9719.
ss Id at 222; Angela Hanks, et al., Systemic Inequality, How America's
StructuralRacism Helped Create the Black-White Wealth Gap, CTR. FOR AM.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/re(2018),
PROGRESS
ports/2018/02/21/447051/systematic-inequality/.
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emergencies."5 6 Results from a Federal Reserve 2019 Survey of
Consumer Finances reveal that family wealth, defined as the difference between gross assets and liabilities, is eight times higher in
White families than in Black families. 57 In 2019 the median level
of wealth for White families was $188,200 and $24,100 for Black
families. The wealth gap has not improved since 1968 and exists
at all income and education levels. 58 Moreover, research shows discrimination in lending, with Blacks more likely to have loan applications denied and have less access to credit and financial support
than Whites.5 9 Whites comprise the overwhelming majority of
small business owners and chief executive officers of corporations. 60 And, Blacks own a minute percentage of the full power
television stations available in the U.S. 6 1
It is not uncommon for commentators to focus on individual failings as the cause of the gap. However, significant data refute claims that the racial wealth gap is caused primarily by cultural, moral, or behavioral weaknesses and focuses on the
structural and political barriers to wealth accumulation.6 2

-

56 Alan Aja, et al, From a Tangle of Pathology to a Race-Fair
America,
DISSENT (2014) https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/from-a-tangle-of-pathology-to-a-race-fair-america.
5 Bhutta, Neil, et al, Disparitiesin Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the
2019 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RSRV. (2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-race-and-ethnicityin-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-202 00928.html
58 Moritz Kuhn, et al, Income and Wealth Inequality in America, 1949
2016, Institute Working Paper 9, 43 OPPORTUNITY & INCLUSIVE GROWTH
INST., FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (2018); William Darity, Jr., et al,
What We Get Wrong, supranote 6, at 6; Oliver and Shapiro, supra note 54 at
2 24-25.
59 Alan Aja, et al, From a Tangle ofPathologyto a Race-FairAmerica, Today's wealth and employment gaps shatterthe myth of a post-racialAmerica,
DISSENT (2014). https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/from-a-tangle-of-pathology-to-a-race-fair-america.; Hanks, supra note 55.
60 Darity, supra note 6 at 33, 50.
61

Kristal Brent Zook, Blacks own just 10 U.S. television stations. Here's

2015),
https://www.washing(August
17,
POST
why.,
WASH.
tonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/08/17/blacks-own-just-10-u-s-televisionstations-heres-why; Black Media Owners to America: 'Actions, More Than
Words', RBR-TVBR (June 15, 2020), https://www.rbr.com/black-radio-owners-to-america-actions-more-than-words.
62 Herring, Wealth Inequality, supra note 5, at 14; Darity, supra note 6, at
3; see, e.g., MELvIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH,
WHITE WEALTH, A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY, 127-77
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Research on discriminatory policies contributing to the wealth
gap's persistence includes income inequality, occupational mobility, credit discrimination, housing discrimination, restrictive covenants, redlining, and business ownership. 63 Research establishes
that the gap persists regardless of education or employment status.64 In analyzing the varied explanations of the ongoing racial
wealth gap, sociologists Cedric Herring and Loren Henderson note
the disparities
compound and accumulate over time and from generation to generation. It offers security and protection to
whites but puts African Americans at risk. Racial wealth
inequality is built into the structure of American society.
It operates in the normal working relationships of institutions, and its perpetuation requires only that people
continue to do business as usual. Its eradication requires
active review of the assumptions and practices by
...
which American institutions operate. 65
Economists like William ("Sandy") Darity have worked to
"bust the myths" that purport to explain the racial wealth gap. For
instance, Darity asserts oft proffered systemic solutions to closing
the gap like homeownership, business development, and entrepreneurship are insufficient, largely because of the discriminatory policies and "entrenched racism. "66 According to Darity, homeownership is correlated with greater wealth, and fewer Blacks own
homes, but homeownership does not explain the racial wealth gap.
Darity states that even among homeowners, "White households
have nearly $140,000 more in net worth than [B]lack households."
The gap persists because of housing and lending discrimination.6 7
(1997), RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW, A FORGOTTEN HISTORY
OF How OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA, 186 (2017).
63

Herring and Henderson, supranote 5, at 6; Oliver and Shapiro, supranote

55 at 224-25.
Darity, supranote 6, at 5-8 ("at every level of educational attainment, the
median wealth among black families is substantially lower than white families
... white households with an employed head have more than ten times higher
wealth than similar black households").
65 Darity, supranote 6, at 15-16.
66 Darity, supra note 6, at 13; Rebecca Tippett, et al., Beyond Broke, Why
64

Closing the Racial Wealth Gap is a Priorityfor National Economic Security,
http://globalpolicysoluCTR. FOR GLOB. POL'Y SOL., 5, 25-26 (2014),
tions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/BeyondBroke_FINAL.pdf.
67 Darity, supra note 6, at 11-12.
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Darity's work further noted that building wealth through business
development is hampered by "the continued exclusion of Blacks
from business credit markets." 8 Similarly, entrepreneurship alone
cannot fix the problem. White entrepreneurs start with more capital and have greater access to small business loans than do Blacks.
Black businesses tend to be smaller, with most having no employees other than the owners and a lower rate of return than Whiteowned companies. 69 Discrimination in employment, housing, and
lending practices fuel the racial gap. 70 In fact, Bank of America
agreed to pay $335 million to settle a housing discrimination lawsuit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice regarding higher
interest rates and fees charged to Black and Hispanics than White
customers."
The "but for" causation standard for discrimination claims
hinders the Civil Rights Act's ability to challenge structural barriers to economic equality and help close the racial wealth gap. Instead, a motivating factor test allows greater access to courts as a
tool to help close the racial wealth gap and respond to racial exclusion from the economic center. Additionally, a motivating factor
approach is more consistent with the science and reality of racism.
The NAAOM decision ignores the current understanding
of the subtle manifestations of race discrimination and makes it
more difficult to call out racist behavior. The Supreme Court's
analysis imposes a pleading structure onto civil rights claims alleging discrimination that advances a view that racial hatred is at the
heart of discrimination. Requiring "but for" causation allegations
reveals an outmoded view of racist behavior that focuses primarily
on being able to isolate overt behavior and ignores the multiple
layers and complex ways in which racism operates." Although
Darity, supranote 6, at 19.
Darity, supranote 6, at 32-36.
70 Oliver and Shapiro, supra note 54 at 239; Walker, supra note 18, at 371.
" Jordan Weissmann, Countrywide's Racist Lending Practices Were
Fueled by Greed, THE ATLANTIC (2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/countrywides-racist-lending-practices-were-fueled-bygreed/250424/; See e.g., USA V. Countrywide, CV11 10540-PSG-AJW (2011),
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-CA-0007-0002 .pdf.
7" Camara Phyllis Jones, Levels of Racism, A Theoretic Framework and a
Gardener's Tale, 90 AM. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1212, 1212 (2000),
10.2105/ajph.90.8.1212; Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108
COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1100 (2008); Ayres, supra note 21, at 846 (1991) (noting
racial animus alone could not explain gender and race discrimination in retail
car negotiations).
68

69
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racism includes the kind of explicit conduct the "but for" causation
standard may address, it also manifests through unconscious bias
based on assumptions about others' abilities, motives, and intentions based on race. 3 Racism reflects a system of privilege that
provides differential access to society's goods, services, and opportunities by race.74 It is structural and embedded in our institutions,
customs, practices, and laws. The "but for" standard makes it difficult to challenge the ways racism creates this system of privilege
that provides differential access to society's goods, services, and
opportunities by race and to lay bare the subtlety of unconscious
racism. A tort-based approach to anti-discrimination laws helps
to render anti-discrimination laws ineffective in their ability to recognize the subtlety of unconscious racism and maintain the racial
wealth gap.
First, as racism has become seen as an increasingly suspect
perspective to adopt, social mores have pushed explicit racism increasingly underground or to be defined as aligned with "white supremacy." As a result, individuals have become more cautious
about exposing racist beliefs.75 Second, implicit biases can affect
decision-making in ways in which the actor may not be fully conscious.7 6 The science of implicit bias suggests that humans' tendency to create cognitive shortcuts to process the 11 million bits of
information every second to which we are exposed includes schemas to sort people into groups or social categories.77 The result is
the creation of stereotypes and biases, often without realizing
we've done so. Thus, implicit bias has been defined as the attitudes
or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions
unconsciously. 78 These biases, which include positive and negative
assessments, can be involuntary and are different from consciously
hiding biases based on how others might perceive you.79 Numerous studies about implicit bias have demonstrated unconscious
73 Jones, supranote 72, at 1212; Robinson, supra note 72, at 1100, 1103.
7" Robinson, supra note 72, at 1107-12.
" Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1507 (2005).
76 Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REv. 945, 961 (2006).
" John A. Powell, Affirmative Action: Where Do We Go from Here?, 48
U.S.F. L. Rev. 281, 287 (2013); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND
SLOw 38 (2013) (explaining the automatic functioning of System 1 thinking as
opposed to the more deliberative, conscious reasoning of System 2 thinking) ;
Kang, supranote 75, at 1498-99 (2005).
78 Greenwald & Krieger, supranote 76, at 966.
" Kang, supra note 75, at 1508.
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biases based on race that individuals often act upon. For example,
a study published in 2004 revealed that employers treat applicants
differently based on whether they believe the resume belongs to a
Black or White applicant. 80 The study involved identical resumes
submitted to potential employers who advertised job openings for
administrative, clerical, or managerial positions in Chicago and
Boston.8 1 "Applicants" named Emily, Greg, and Sarah received
call backs fifty percent more often than "applicants" named Lakisha, Jamal, or Latoya.8 2 The researchers concluded that bias or
perceptions about the applicants based on race accounted for the
different response rate. 83 Other studies have shown similar results
and have found no change in the levels of hiring discrimination
against African Americans since 1989, challenging those who argue that discrimination in America has decreased.8 4 Further complicating the role implicit bias can play in decision making is the
human behavior to "explain away" their behavior. Studies show
that there is a "the human tendency to offer compelling explanations for one's own behavior even when such explanations have
little to do with the real reasons behind that behavior."8 5 Moreover, implicit bias studies demonstrate that unconscious views on
race can cause decision-makers to "subtly adjust criteria in real
time to modify their judgments of merit" further influencing their
behavior. 86
Business savvy defendants, who are aware of anti-discrimination laws, are not likely to display overt racial bias in negotiating business deals and are more likely to act subtly or even without

80 Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Are EmilyandGregMore
Employable than Lakisha andJamal?A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination, 84
THE
AM.
ECON.
REV.,
991-1013
(2004)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592802 Accessed: 04/02/2009 22:19.

81

Id at 994.

82 Id at 998.
83 Id. at 1010-11.
84 Lincoln Quillian, et al, Meta-analysis of field experiments shows no

change in racial discrimination in hiring over time, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NAT'L

ACAD.

OF

SCI.

OF

THE

U.S.

(2017),

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1706255114.
85 Michael Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias, The Impact of
Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 36, 39 (2006).
86 Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 U.C.L. REV. 1124,
1129 (2012).
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87
full cognition of their behavior's rationales. There can be a tendency to want to engage in business with people you feel comfortable with and share common experiences or friends with. Feelings
of discomfort with close contact with people of races other than
your own may arise. 88 Living in segregated America can result in
limited contact with people from other races, which may cause discomfort with and stereotyping of people of races different than
your own.89
The refusal to contract with a Black media company can
have complex motivations regarding an unwillingness to contract
with a person of color, be associated with "Black products, or conclude that Black products and services to be inferior." 90 Similarly,
differential treatment may be grounded in racism or suspicions
about black clients or customers. This kind of marketplace discrimination that evidences an undervaluation of Black consumers
or a fear of alienating a White customer base has been well documented.9' The refusal to contract could also be based on the inabil92
ity to see "Blacks" as business executives to be taken seriously.
The case is also important because of the outsized role media companies play in shaping people's perceptions of others. Making it
difficult for plaintiffs to bring discrimination claims that allow a
window into whether media companies are illegally excluding access to corporate power can only heighten and concentrate the

87 See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias,
Decision-making, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345, 353 (2007).
ss Id. at 362-63, 366.
s9 See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Race, Ethnicity, and
PlaceIdentity: ImplicitBias and CompetingBelief Systems, 37 U. HAw. L. REV.
313, 324 (2015); Christopher Ingraham, Three Quartersof Whites Don't Have
Any Non-white Friends, THE WASH. POST, (2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/2 5/three-quarters-of-whites-dont-haveany-non-white-friends/.
90 See, e.g., JOE R. FEAGIN AND MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM:
THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE, 214-15, 222 (1995).
91 Id. at 48; Cassi Pittman, "Shopping While Black" Black Consumers'
Management of Racial Stigma and Racial Profiling in Retail Settings, 20 J.

CONSUMER

CULTURE

https://doi.org/10.1177/146954051

3,
77 7777;

1

4-5,

16

(2020),

Kennedy, supra note 32, at 287.

92 Andrew M. Carton and Ashleigh Shelby Rosette, ExplainingBiasAgainst
Black Leaders:Integrating Theory on Information Processingand Goal-Based
1154
(2011),
1141,
J.
MGMT.
ACAD.
54
Stereotyping,
7

http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.0 45.

202 1 ]

Seeking EconomicJustice in Face ofRacism

35 9

control of images of black Americans. 93 In turn, closing off that
access limits opportunities to build wealth and influence.94
Judges are not immune to the force of unconscious bias.
Studies show that judges have the same implicit biases as the rest
of society, and these biases, can affect behavior. 95 Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that a pleading standard in discrimination
cases that increases judicial discretion may make it more possible
for implicit bias to creep into the decision-making and further subvert the role of pleadings in litigation. The plaintiffs initial pleading typically provides the plaintiff their first opportunity to present
their story to the court and the defendants. Although the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure contain a "notice" pleading standard that
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing they
are entitled to relief, the Supreme Court's 2009 opinion in Ashcroft
v Igbal imposed a plausibility standard onto the notice pleading
requirement. 96 The IgbalCourtdirects district court judges to dismiss complaints for failure to state a claim where the complaint
fails to allege plausible facts. The Court reassures us that the plausibility standard does not require detailed facts or that the allegations meet a probability test. 97 It advises that lower courts judges
use their "judicial experience" and "common sense" to determine
whether the allegations are plausible.
Jerry Kang, in his co-authored article, Implicit Bias in the
Courts, reasons that the plausibility standard in discrimination
cases allows the judging of plaintiffs on "minimal facts," which
opens the door for judges to rely on "schemas," "presumptions, or
stereotypes about the parties." This is particularly concerning
when judges do not have the experiences to recognize and understand the racial dynamics and slights alleged in a discrimination
complaint.
See generally, Matt Stoller, Remote Control, A Civil Rights Lawsuit
Highlights How Comcast's Monopoly Crushes Media Diversity, THE AM.
93

PROSPECT, (Mar. 26, 2020), https://prospect.org/power/remote-control-comcast-

monopoly-crushes-diversity/.

94 Id.
9 Justin
Levinson et al., JudginglmplicitBias: A NationalEmpiricalStudy
offudicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REv. 63 (2017); Levinson, Forgotten Racial
Equality, supra note 87, at 353; Jeffrey Rachlinski et al., Does UnconsciousRacial Bias Affect Trialjudges, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195, 1221 (2009); Andrea Miller, Expertise Failsto Attenuate GenderedBiases in JudicialDecision-

Making, UNIV. OF IL NEWS BUREAU (2018).
96 Ashcroft v..Iqbal, 555 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
'" Id. at 678.
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According to the Center for American Progress, "[B]lacks
comprise 10 percent of sitting judges and 13 percent of active
judges." 98 Black women make up only 3 percent of all sitting
judges and 5 percent of active judges. 99 Whites comprise 80% of
active judges at the Court of Appeals level and are 39 out of 91
Article III district judges.100 As noted by the Center for American
Progress,
When deciding cases that affect historically underrepresented groups, federal judges who do not belong to such
groups may have difficulty recognizing and contextualizing unique concerns or hardships experienced by those
whose or rights are being infringed upon; this may result
in miscarriages of justice.10 1
A predominately White judiciary coupled with the more
significant role for judges to import their judicial experience and
common sense in ruling on motions to dismiss, as required by Iqbal, raises concern about the potential impact on plaintiffs seeking
to bring discrimination claims.10 2 Additionally, researchers have
posited that the decision led to an increase in motions to dismiss
3
being filed and granted, particularly in discrimination claims.11
Patricia Hatamayar found an increase in dismissal rates in Title
VII employment discrimination cases after Iqbal that was not
found in contract cases. Similarly, in a separate study, Victor
98

Examining the Demographic Compositions of U.S. Circuit and District

Courts, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, (2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2020/02/13/480112/examining-demographic-compositionsu-s-circuit-district-courts/.
99

Id

100Id

101

Id

Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Substance in the Shadow of Procedure:The
Integration of Substantive and ProceduralLaw in Title Vii Cases, 33 B.C. L.
REV. 211, 244-45, 247-48 (1992).
103 Demography of Article HIjudges, FED. JUD. CTR., 1789-2017 (last visited Apr. 15, 2021) https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/raceand-ethnicity.According to the Federal Judicial Center, in 2017 of the Article III
judges then serving, 1,074 were white, 90 were identified as Hispanic, 2 American Indian, 27 Asian American, and 146 African American; Patricia W. Hatamayar, The Tao of Pleading:Do Twombly andIqbal Matter Empirically?, 59
AM. U. L. REv. 553, 597 (2010); Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense:
A PsychologicalStudy of Iqbal's Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17
102

MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011).
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Quintanilla found a rise in dismissals in all federal employment
discrimination cases brought under Title VII and §1981 post-Iqba104 A standard that requires pleading plausible facts and allegations of "but for" causation at an early stage of the litigation provides greater opportunities for unconscious bias about the plaintiff
and the defendant to creep into the process, increasing the likelihood that § 1981 claims will be dismissed, and making it more difficult to assert economic rights through the courts.0 5
The NAAOM opinion's imposition of a tort standard for
pleading discrimination claims that imposed a causation requirement not explicitly provided for in the Civil Rights statute subverts
the statute's purpose. It pushes race and racism into the background. It is problematic that the Comcast Court's opinion sets
the pleading standard for alleging discrimination without acknowledging or mentioning racism and referencing prejudice only
once in its opinion.10 6 Judges may rely on racial stereotypes in assessing the plausibility of plaintiffs' allegations about discrimination in contracting. They may also depend on stereotypes about the
rationality of business decisions of the defendants. They may assume a logic regarding the proffered explanations for the refusal to
contract in contrast with the plaintiffs assertions of the defendant's discriminatory conduct or difference in treatment during contract negotiations. In fact, studies have shown that Whites tend to
believe "non-racist" explanations for behavior more than Blacks.0 7
This tendency to discredit and discount Black's experience with
racism can be seen as the unwillingness to believe Blacks' interpretation of ambiguous events. In fact, the NAA OMdistrict and Supreme Courts seem to pay little attention to the complaint's
104 Hatamayer, supra note 103, at 597; Quintanilla, supranote 103 at 5.
105 See, e.g., Williams v. Tech Mahindra (Ams.), Inc., No. 3:20-cv-04684
(BRM) (LHG), 2021 WL 302929 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2021); Simmons v. Triton Ele-

vator, LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1206-B, 2020 WL 7770245 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2020);
Lemon v. Myers Bigel, P.A., 985 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2021); Sharifi Takieh v. Banner Health, No. CV-19-05878-PHX-MTL, 2021 WL 268808 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27,
2021); Swinton v. 10 Fitness Inc. Rodney Parham, No. 4:20-cv-00177-LPR, 2020
WL 7495535 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 21, 2020).
106 Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1014; see, e.g., Baumann, supra note 102, at
220 (noting courts' tendency to avoid acknowledging "that their procedural decisions define substantive rights").
107 Evelyn R. Carter & Mary C. Murphy, Group-basedDifferences in Perceptions of Racism: What Counts, to Whom, and Why?, 9 SOC. AND
PERSONALITY PSYCH. COMPASS 269, 270-71 (2015), https://equity.ucla.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2016/1 1/Carter-Murphy-2015.pdf.
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assertion that a Comcast executive stated that the company was
not "trying to create any more Bob Johnsons." The plaintiffs
thought it was clear that the executive was referring to the African
American founder of BET, and the remark had racially discriminatory intent to either avoid forming business relationships with
Black business owners or to avoid a mostly Black customer base.
The NAA OM ruling imposes an additional burden on
plaintiffs to allege that the defendant would have acted differently
if not for discriminatory intent, which is a more stringent and less
"forgiving causation standard" than the "motivating factor" approach to pleading discrimination claims.1 08 The "but for" causation standard imposed on §1981 claims also not only increases judicial discretion, but it also forces plaintiffs to reveal more about
their case at the outset of litigation than under the Igbalfailure to
state a claim test. The approach is more burdensome on plaintiffs
and increases a power disparity in these cases that often find
greater access to information and resources on the defendant's side.
It may be difficult for a plaintiff to allege these facts without access
to the discovery process. 10 9 The "but for" standard invites early dismissals of § 1981 claims, thereby closing access to discovery that
could help to reveal facts that support allegations regarding the
racist basis of that behavior which has the effect of dulling the ability of § 1981 to surface implicit bias in contracting.
Even plaintiffs who successfully defend against a motion to
dismiss are disadvantaged by the process. Plaintiffs face increased
litigation costs to meet the "but for" standard and respond to dismissal efforts." 0 In addition to increased litigation costs, plaintiffs
who are successful at the pleading stage would have revealed a
great deal more about their case and litigation strategy under this
more stringent standard. Plaintiffs must now engage in a more
"defensive" pleading strategy in discrimination cases to address
any nondiscriminatory explanations for defendants' conduct. This
is an approach that requires substantially more of discrimination
See, e.g., Catherine Tarantino, ContractingFree from Racial Animus:
Comcast Corporationv. NationalAssociation ofAfrican American-OwnedMedia andEntertainment Studios, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR
77, 78 (2020).
109 See, e.g., Anne-Marie G. Harris, et al., Courting Customers: Assessing
Consumer Racial Profilingand Other MarketplaceDiscrimination,24 J. PUB.
POL'Y & MKTG. 163 (2005); see also Andrea Freeman, Racism in the CreditCard
108

Industry, 95 N.C. L. REv. 1071, 1111 (2017).
10 See, e.g., Baumann, supra note 102, at 239 (noting the increased discovery burdens on plaintiffs in Title VII cases).
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litigants than ever before and than is required of other plaintiffs
bringing other types of claims.
The Court's "but for" requirement for pleadings set out in
NAA OMraisesthe barrier to entry for §1981 plaintiffs while placing a protective shield around defendants. The case impacts wellfinanced business people and anyone seeking to enter into contracts, including consumers involved in ordinary day-to-day transactions in stores."' Individual plaintiffs who wish to rely on the
Civil Rights Act to obtain relief for racially discriminatory experiences may find it nearly impossible to meet the "but for" pleading
requirement imposed by the Court. Moreover, the NAAOMstandard gives credence to the belief that discrimination plaintiffs are
not to be believed unless there is evidence of explicit racism, a notion out of step with the reality of how racist behavior often affects
its victims. A pleading standard that bars access to the courts for
discrimination plaintiffs blunts the Civil Rights anti-discrimination laws' ability to make real change in the imbalance of economic
power and acts as a tool to destabilize economic, racial hierarchies.
Instead of playing a role in modernizing the understanding of racism in discrimination cases, the Supreme Court seems to be trying
to turn back the clock on the ability of anti-discrimination principles and the courts to create change and help dismantle that "Other
America."
The Court's "but for" pleading standard for §1981 claims is
consistent with the view that courts use "procedure to change the
substance" of statutes.1" Further, the Court has once again restricted access to discrimination statutes through procedural requirements." 3 As noted in an analysis of Title VII employment
discrimination cases, authors Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith
Olans Brown, Stephen N. Subrin state,
without grappling with the nature of discrimination, theories of equality, or the historical and sociological complexity of employment disparities between AfricanAmericans and whites, the courts have rewritten the law
and changed workplace behavior using the language of

1" Kennedy, supra note 32, at 306.
112 Baumann, supranote 102, at 220 (asserting that substance and procedure
are "intimately intertwined").
113 See e.g., Deseriee A. Kennedy, ProcessingCivil Rights Summary Judgment andConsumer DiscriminationClaims, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 989,996 (2004).
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procedure. . . . [P]rocedure is now the master, not the
handmaid, of substance." 4
This critique is equally applicable to the NAAOM decision.
Unfortunately, the role that courts have played in holding
the promise of an avenue for vindicating economic rights while at
the same time often falling short of a tool for significant long-lasting racial change is not new. Historian Melissa Milewski in an
analysis of civil cases between Black and White southerners from
1861 through 1950, revealed a history of African Americans appealing to civil courts for legal and economic rights, including the
right to make contracts.11 5 Although her historical study of early
civil cases found Blacks seeking to vindicate their economic rights
through the legal system found some success in civil courts, they
were less successful when acting on behalf of similarly situated
Blacks in challenging racial discrimination. 116 She concludes that
although,
individual African Americans were at times able to work
within the limitations of the US court system to gain decisions in their favor . . . the justice that they received
remained only a limited, partial justice - forged within a
system of white supremacy and often designed to benefit
whites just as much as the African Americans litigating
these suits."'
The NAAOMdecision is an example of using procedural rules to
reduce civil rights legislations' ability to achieve racial justice.

V.

CONCLUSION

In describing the "Other America," Dr. King remarked that
"millions of work-starved men walk the streets daily in search of
jobs that do not exist . .. In this America people are poor by the
millions. They find themselves perishing on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity."1 18 Dr. King
situated the Other America within a historical context and, in so
doing, underscored the need for the civil rights legislation aimed at

114
"s

116
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Baumann, supra note 102, at 220.
Milewski, supranote 15, at 16.
Milewski, supranote 15, at 192.
Milewski, supranote 15, at 193.

"18 50 Years Ago, supra note 1.
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undoing the Other America. King cited Frederick Douglass's that
emancipation absent legal protections for the formerly enslaved
was just "freedom to hunger . . . freedom without roofs to cover
their heads. . . It was freedom and famine at the same time."1 1 9 In
closing his speech, Dr. King noted that Americans of different races
were "caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny." 20 To his mind, social justice meant a necessary sharing of power to build a new nation, not a subtle defense
of hierarchies that perpetuate the divide of which he so eloquently
spoke.
Dr. King preached about economic power and an "economic bill of rights" because he understood racial equality and economic equality are inextricably linked."' He recognized that creating economic security requires a societal and not solely an
individual response. 2 The solutions to reaching that equality, ending racial discrimination in contracting, and closing the racial
wealth gap are complex and varied. Still, without meaningful access to courts to challenge the discriminatory policies that create
and maintain racial hierarchies in wealth, the change will be slow,
if not impossible. The Supreme Court's shift to making it more
difficult for those negatively affected by racially discriminatory
practices to have access to justice means we are less likely to see
the racial gap close. Raising the barrier to entry can have the effect
of discouraging plaintiffs, dismissing meritorious claims before
trial, and encouraging those who explicitly or implicitly close access to financial development to others on account of race.
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